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Avoiding the Problem of the Commons in a 
Communist Society: The Role of Water Rights in the 
Enforcement of Environmental Law in China 
Sonja Schiller∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the initiation of Deng Xiaoping’s policy of “reform and 
opening” (gaige kaifang) over twenty years ago, extraordinary rates 
of urbanization and industrialization have dramatically impacted 
China’s gross domestic product (“GDP”) and demographics. Between 
1978 and 2005, China’s GDP grew an average of 9.4% annually, 
boosting the economy from the forty-eighth to the fourth largest in 
the world behind the United States, Japan, and Germany.1 Nearly 
concurrently, China reduced the percentage of its population living in 
poverty2 from 53% to 8%, decreasing the world population living in 
extreme poverty3 by 400 million people.4  
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 1. Alex Wang, The Role of Law in Environmental Protection in China: Recent 
Developments, 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 195, 199 (2006–2007) (citing Keith Bradsher, China Reports 
Another Year of Strong (or Even Better) Growth, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2006, at C5).  
 2. The World Bank has defined the poverty line as living on less than US$2.00 per day. 
The World Bank, Overview: Understanding Poverty, http://go.worldbank.org/RQBDCTUXW0 
(last visited Dec. 29, 2008).  
 3. The World Bank defines “extreme poverty” as living on less than US$1.00 per day. 
Id. 
 4. The World Bank, Fighting Poverty: Findings and Lessons from China’s Success, 
http://go.worldbank.org/QXOQI9MP30 (last visited Dec. 29, 2008) (discussing the research of 
Martin Ravallion and Shaohua Chen); see also Wang, supra note 1, at 199. 
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With its “pollute first, control later” (xian wuran, hou zhili) model 
of development, China’s exceptional growth has come at an immense 
environmental cost.5 China’s model of development threatens a 
sufficient supply of potable fresh water. With only 6% of the world’s 
fresh water resources to provide water to 22% of the world’s 
population, China confronts severe water shortages.6 China’s annual 
per capita water supply (2200m3) is only 25% of the global average; 
by 2030, China’s per capita water supply is predicted to fall to 
1700m3.7 Of 668 cities in China, 400 currently experience water 
shortages.8 Water pollution endangers China’s already scarce water 
resources: hazardous waste, pesticides, fertilizers, and polluted 
surface water contaminate China’s groundwater.9 Eighty percent of 
China’s major rivers are too polluted to support fish.10 Water 
 
 5. By some estimates, accounting for the costs of environmental pollution negates 
China’s exponential economic growth: environmental pollution costs China between 3–8% of 
its annual gross domestic product (“GDP”). THE WORLD BANK, CLEAR WATER, BLUE SKIES: 
CHINA’S ENVIRONMENT IN THE NEW CENTURY 23 (1997) (noting that the conservative estimate 
for air and water pollution clean up is 8% of the country’s total GDP); see also ELIZABETH C. 
ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK: THE ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGE TO CHINA’S FUTURE 
25 (2004). Some analysts predict that as China’s demand for fresh water outstrips supply, the 
Chinese economy could collapse, even by 2015. John Vidal, Costs of Water Shortage: Civil 
Unrest, Mass Migration and Economic Collapse, THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 17, 2006, at 25.  
 6. Per capita, China’s water resources in river basins are only 35% of the global average. 
Dajun Shen, The 2002 Water Law: Its Impacts on River Basin Management in China, 6 WATER 
POL’Y 345, 346 (2004).  
 7. China’s Environmental Challenge: Hearing on Major Challenges Facing Chinese 
Leadership Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 109th Cong. 52 
(2006) (statement of Elizabeth C. Economy, C.V. Starr Senior Fellow and Dir., Asia Studies, 
Council on Foreign Relations), available at http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/hearingsarchive.php# 
hearings2006 (follow “Major Internal Challenges Facing the Chinese Leadership” hyperlink).  
 8. Figure according to the Chinese Ministry of Water Resources. Beth E. Kinne, 
Developing Property Rights in Water in Modern China (Dec. 2005) (unpublished LL.M. thesis, 
University of Washington) (on file with author). Water scarcity is exacerbated in China’s arid—
but heavily populated—northern regions, which have 65.4% of the cultivated land and 46.1% of 
the population, but only 19% of water resources. Regional water disparities have led to the 
ambitious North-South water transfer plan in which large scale water transfers from the water-
rich southern provinces to the water-poor northern provinces will help offset water scarcity. See 
China’s Multi-Billion-Dollar North-South Water Project Facing Delays, AM. FREE PRESS, Nov. 
21, 2007, available at http://afp.google.com/article/ALegM5h5bR1tplYyfgdWS3H4JRO7k0g 
VH.  
 9. Elizabeth C. Economy, The Great Leap Backward?, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Sept./Oct. 
2007, at 3, 42–43.  
 10. Maude Barlow, Water Incorporated: The Commodification of the World’s Water, 17 
EARTH ISLAND J. 30 (Spring 2002), available at http://www.earthisland.org (follow “Earth 
Island Journal” hyperlink; then follow “Archives” hyperlink).  
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scarcity—as exacerbated by endemic pollution—has left an estimated 
500 million Chinese without access to clean drinking water.11 
Polluted water accounts for increasing rates of cancer and other 
pollution-related diseases.12 Aggressive economic development and 
related water pollution have diminished China’s already scarce water 
resources.  
China’s water scarcity has global repercussions:13 with food 
resources strained by the pressures of increased consumer demand14 
and diminishing freshwater resources, China will be forced to import 
grain more frequently to compensate for a shrinking food supply.15 
Aggravated by endemic water pollution, water scarcity has fueled 
internal social unrest:16 recent reports estimate that nearly one 
 
 11. See Joseph Kahn & Jim Yardley, As China Roars, Pollution Reaches Deadly 
Extremes, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2007, at A1; see also Wang Mingyuan, China’s Pollutant 
Discharge System Evolves Behind Its Economic Expansion, 19 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 95, 97 (2008). 
Ninety percent of urban watersheds are polluted to some degree. Kinne, supra note 8, at 5. 
Some official statistics indicate this number might be even higher: in a SEPA survey of 118 
cities, 97% of the underground water was contaminated. Li Lifeng & Zou Lan, China’s Water 
Crisis, in THE CHINA ENVIRONMENT YEARBOOK (2005) 155, 161 (Liang Congjie & Yang 
Dongping eds., 2007).  
 12. According to The World Bank, China’s failure to provide piped water to two-thirds of 
the rural population accounts for nearly 11% of cases of gastrointestinal cancer in China and is 
a leading cause of death among children under the age of five. Economy, supra note 9, at 43. 
The heavy metals, chemicals, and other pollutants that contaminate surface and groundwater 
may result in “malignancies, birth defects, and impair[ed] immune systems.” Shun Yong Yeh, 
Is China’s Development Path Sustainable? An Overview on the Legal and Policy Framework in 
Relation to Environmental Protection in China, 2 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 
399, 414 (2007) (citing STOCKHOLM ENVIRONMENTAL INSTITUTE, CHINA HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2002: MAKING GREEN DEVELOPMENT A CHOICE 32 (2002), available 
at http://www.undp.org.cn (follow “Building Knowledge” hyperlink; then follow 
“Publications” hyperlink)).  
 13. Over the past one hundred years, water usage has increased by six times and will 
double again by 2050. Vidal, supra note 5 (statistics cited from the article’s interview of Frank 
Rijsberman, Director of the International Water Management Institute). 
 14. Along with increased food consumption, wealthier Chinese will also use more water: 
from 1980 to 2001, domestic water use increased nearly 100%; by 2050, the total water use is 
estimated to reach 730 km3. Dajun Shen, supra note 6, at 349.  
 15. In China, where approximately 70% of agriculture relies on irrigation, dwindling 
water tables will lead to rising food prices. Water scarcity will not only impact water supply, 
but food supply as well, likely affecting food prices globally as China is forced to import food. 
Michael Dorgan, China’s Water Supply Drying Up, PHILA. INQUIRER, July 8, 2000, at A01 
(quoting Sheri Liao); see also Lester R. Brown & Brian Halweil, China’s Water Shortage 
Could Shake World Food Security, WORLD WATCH, July/Aug. 1998, at 10, 10. 
 16. Local governments have been under increased pressure to respond to social unrest 
over pollution since the devastating benzene contamination of the Songhua River in 2005 and 
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thousand pollution-related protests occur in China every week.17 
China’s urban centers and industrial sectors are disproportionately 
responsible for growing water shortages, heightening tension within 
rural areas.18 Without an effective system of transferable water 
permits, China will confront increasingly scarce water resources and 
incompletely enforced environmental laws. If unaddressed, China’s 
growing water scarcity will undermine social stability and devastate 
the economy. 
Part I of this Note examines the development of China’s modern 
legal system—including the recent unprecedented recognition of 
private property as a form of ownership—and describes challenges to 
systematic enforcement of environmental laws and regulations. Part I 
also discusses the history of water rights in China and the recent 
emergence of property interests in water vis-à-vis the sale and 
transfer of water permits. Part II analyzes how China’s 2007 Real 
Right Law gives legal protection to usufructuary rights in water 
permits and encourages the sustainable use of water, and the 
investment therein, that is fundamental to continued economic 
development. Parts III and IV propose that legal recognition of 
property interests in water will heighten enforcement of 
environmental laws by providing water pollution victims an alternate 
ground for standing to bring environmental litigation.  
 
the subsequent increase in publicity of rural protests. Yingling Liu, Villagers Attack Factories 
Over Pollution in Eastern China, WORLDWATCH INST., Apr. 13, 2006, http://www.worldwatch. 
org/node/3911.  
 17. Economy, supra note 9, at 47–48. Indicative of the growing violence in protest of 
unenforced pollution standards, in 2005, “30,000 to 40,000 villagers from Zhejiang Province 
swarmed 13 chemical plants, broke windows and overturned buses, attacked government 
officials, and torched police cars.” Id. at 48. The Chinese government sent ten thousand 
members of the People’s Armed Police to respond to the violence and later ordered the plants 
closed. Id. 
 18. From 1980 to 2005, agricultural water use decreased from 85% to 65%, while urban 
and industrial demand increased 100% and 150%, respectively. Kinne, supra note 8, at 5 (citing 
Wang Shucheng, Minister of Ministry of Water Res., P.R.C., Speech on Managing Water 
Resources and Ensuring Food Security in China (Mar. 2, 2005), available at 
http://www.mwr.gov.cn/english1/20050307/48331.asp); see also Dajun Shen, supra note 6, at 
349–50.  
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I. HISTORY 
A. China’s Legal and Regulatory Framework 
Understanding the complexities of China’s system of 
environmental law explains the seriousness of China’s environmental 
problems. “[T]he National People’s Congress (NPC) is the highest-
level legislative body[,] . . . empowered . . . to enact and amend 
‘fundamental’ national statutes, including [those specifying the] 
establishment and organization of government institutions . . . .”19 
Within the NPC, the Standing Committee enacts and amends all 
national laws, including environmental protection statutes. The 
Standing Committee may also amend and supplement laws enacted 
by the NPC, insofar as the amendments do not contravene the laws’ 
“fundamental principles.”20 Specialized advisory committees within 
the NPC draft national laws and oversee their implementation.21 For 
example, the “Environmental Protection and Natural Resources 
Conservation Committee” drafts legislation and implements laws 
relating to natural resource management and environmental 
protection.22  
Immediately under the NPC is the State Council, China’s highest-
level administrative body and the executive authority of the NPC. 
The State Council “approve[s] and promulgate[s] national 
administrative regulations [and] issue[s] decisions in orders in 
accordance with the Constitution and other laws.”23 Below the State 
Council, numerous administrative departments, including the State 
Environmental Protection Agency (“SEPA”), are responsible for 
 
 19. Richard J. Ferris, Jr. & Hongjun Zhang, Reaching Out to the Rule of Law: China’s 
Continuing Efforts to Develop an Effective Environmental Law Regime, 11 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 569, 576 (2003). “Fundamental” national statutes include those that concern the 
“establishment, organization and responsibilities of the NPC, people’s governments, people’s 
courts, civil and criminal liabilities, government prosecutory functions, and issues related to 
special administrative and autonomous regions.” Id. at 576 n.27. 
 20. Id. at 576. 
 21. The specialized advisory committees are comprised of experienced congressional 
representatives with backgrounds in the respective subject matters. Id. at 577. 
 22. Id.  
 23. Id. at 577–78. In addition, the State Council “review[s] legislative proposals for 
referral to the NPC or its Standing Committee . . . and . . . oversee[s] the work of its underlying 
ministries and commissions.” Id. at 578. 
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environmental protection and issue “ministerial regulations”24 within 
their areas of competence.25 Inferior administrative departments may 
also propose national legislation, which may become law if approved 
by the State Council and adopted by the NPC.26 
Provincial people’s congresses (and their associated standing 
committees) may also issue provincial-level regulations, provided 
that they do not contravene the Constitution or national laws and 
regulations.27 At the local level, municipal people’s congresses may 
also draft and issue local regulations, subject to the same restrictions 
as at the provincial level, with the additional limitation that the local 
regulations may not contravene the provincial-level regulations. To 
ensure that municipal-level regulations do not contravene provincial 
regulations, municipal people’s congresses must receive approval of 
draft regulations from their provincial people’s congress before 
promulgating the regulations.28  
B. Market Reform, Resource Allocation, and the Emergence of 
Environmental Law  
Intergovernmental power dynamics and top-down centralized 
authority have hindered the enforcement of environmental law in 
China. Following the foundation of the People’s Republic of China in 
1949, the central government gained a prominent role through its 
creation of a centralized, planned economy. Reinforced through the 
 
 24. Typically, it is not necessary for the State Council to review ministerial regulations 
before they are promulgated by the drafting ministries or administrative departments. Id. at 579. 
 25. Id. Article 7 of the Law on Environmental Protection of the People’s Republic of 
China grants SEPA the authority to supervise and administer environmental protection works. 
Huan jing bao hu fa [Environmental Protection Law] (promulgated by the President, Dec. 26, 
1989, effective Dec. 26, 1989), art. 7, translated in LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Dec. 29, 2008) 
(P.R.C.) [hereinafter EPL]. 
 26. Ferris & Hungjun Zhang, supra note 19, at 579. 
 27. Four of China’s municipalities—including Chongqing, Beijing, Tianjin, and 
Shanghai—and China’s autonomous regions—Inner Mongolia, Xizang (Tibet), Ningxia, 
Guangxi, and Xinjiang—possess law-making powers similar to those at the provincial level. 
See id. 
 28. With respect to the development of influential laws—particularly in the area of 
environmental protection—local governments are increasingly the “trend setters” in China. Id. 
at 580. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol29/iss1/13
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remnants of Confucian ideology,29 the powerful, “fatherly” 
centralized state allocated resources among provincial “sons,” who 
competed for resources under the planned economy.30 As reinforced 
by China’s Confucian and Communist ideological roots, ownership 
of natural resources by the “fatherly” state31 posed few problems. A 
value for the community over the individual discouraged over-
consumption of public goods for personal gain. Prior to China’s 1979 
market reforms, Confucian norms of “other-regarding preferences . . . 
‘internalize[d]’ what would otherwise be external costs and benefits 
. . . achiev[ing] better outcomes, in terms of both individual and 
aggregate social welfare.”32 
 
 29. As one of the primary ethical and philosophical ideologies of ancient China, 
Confucianism emphasizes the hierarchical relationships between things, with the ruler at the 
axis of the sky, humans, and the Earth. Confucianism also premised that rites—not laws—
should govern behavior. The Chinese Legal Tradition: A Three-Part Discussion of the Chinese 
Legal Tradition, Rule of Law: The Story of Human Rights in World History, 2004 ORIAS 
Summer Teacher’s Inst., Univ. of Cal. at Berkeley Office of Res. for Int’l & Area Studies (July 
26–30, 2004), http://orias.berkeley.edu/summer2004/summer2004Chinalegal.htm. As opposed 
to uniform laws, li, “those precepts of propriety and ritual, differentiated by reference to one’s 
place in the family and in society,” governed rules and punishments, which varied according to 
personal relationships. John W. Head, Codes, Cultures, Chaos, and Champions: Common 
Features of Legal Codification Experiences in China, Europe, and North America, 13 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT’L L. 1, 37 (2003). Accordingly:  
[T]he li were not positive rules; indeed, in a sense they were not rules at all. They 
lacked the quality of positiveness because they were not understood, formulated, or 
obeyed as something apart from the concrete relationships that established an 
individual’s identity and social place. No one made the li; they were the living, 
spontaneous order of society, an order that human will, though capable of disturbing, 
was powerless to create.  
Id. (quoting ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 94 (1976)). Influenced 
by Confucianism’s deference to li, which were largely unwritten, Chinese society considered 
written law an ineffective means of structuring society. As a result, legal codification was slow 
to achieve. Id. For further discussion of the rule of law in China before 1949, see Qiang Fang & 
Roger Des Forges, Were Chinese Rulers Above the Law? Toward a Theory of the Rule of Law 
in China from Early Times to 1949 CE, 44 STAN. J. INT’L L. 101 (2008). 
 30. Wang Yahua, Commentary, Water Dispute in the Yellow River Basin: Challenges to a 
Centralized System, 6 CHINA ENV’T SERIES 94, 95 (2003).  
 31. One could view water resource management “through a Confucian lens—the strong 
‘fatherly’ central government doling out resources . . . under the centralized planning system [in 
which] the provincial ‘sons’ strived to gain more resources.” Subsequent to the 1978 market 
reforms, economic and administrative authority became more decentralized. Id. 
 32. Lynn A. Stout, Social Norms and Other-Regarding Preferences, in NORMS AND THE 
LAW, 13, 15 (John N. Drobak ed., 2006).  
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Subsequent to its market reforms, China has officially embraced 
the “rule of law,” resulting in the unprecedented creation of legal 
frameworks to allocate resources.33 In 1979, the Standing Committee 
enacted China’s first prominent environmental statute, the 
Environmental Protection Law (“EPL”).34 The EPL established 
concepts fundamental to environmental protection, including: (1) the 
right of individuals to bring claims against polluters, and (2) the 
ability of provincial and local governments to establish local 
pollutant discharge standards35 (for those activities not specified in 
the national standards) and to specify more stringent standards than 
those already set at the national level.36  
C. Shifting Cultural Norms and Challenges to the Enforcement of 
Environmental Laws 
Since 1979, market reforms have made personal economic gain 
viable for the first time, producing the problem of the commons in 
unbounded access to natural resources.37 Increasing per capita 
incomes and changing cultural values have shifted focus away from 
the community to the individual, discouraging universal cooperation 
 
 33. Patricia Wouters, Desheng Hu, Jiebin Zhang, A. Dan Tarlock & Philip Andrews-
Speed, The New Development of Water Law in China, 7 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 243, 247–48 
(2004). 
 34. EPL, supra note 25. 
 35. Article 10 of the Rules for the Implementation of the Law on Prevention and Control 
of Water Pollution states that the local governments’ environmental protection departments 
shall issue pollutant discharge permits. Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Law on the 
Prevention and Control of Water Pollution (promulgated by the State Council, Mar. 20, 2000, 
effective Mar. 20, 2000), art. 10, translated in LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Dec. 29, 2008) 
(P.R.C.). For a discussion of China’s water pollutant discharge permit system, see Wang 
Mingyuan, supra note 11, at 108–11. 
 36. While the EPL focuses on pollution control, it does not address natural resource 
management. Ferris & Hongjun Zhang, supra note 19, at 582–83. 
 37. Ostrom and Ostrom define common-pool resources as “natural or man-made resources 
for which exclusion is difficult and costly to achieve, and use is subtractable.” Edella Schlager, 
Getting the Relationships Right in Water Property Rights, in WATER RIGHTS REFORM: 
LESSONS FOR INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 27, 37 (Bryan Randolph Bruns, Claudia Ringler & Ruth 
Meinzen-Dick eds., 2005) (citing Vincent Ostrom & Elinor Ostrom, Public Goods and Public 
Choices, in ALTERNATIVES FOR DELIVERING PUBLIC SERVICES: TOWARD IMPROVED 
PERFORMANCE (E.S. Savas ed., 1977), reprinted in POLYCENTRICITY AND LOCAL PUBLIC 
ECONOMIES 75 (Michael D. McGinnis ed., 1999)); see also Gary D. Libecap, Open-Access 
Losses and Delay in the Assignment of Property Rights, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 379 (2008).  
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among users of open-access resources such as water.38 The 
development of the market economy has gradually decentralized 
economic and administrative authority, improved the transparency of 
laws and regulations, and increased the autonomy of provincial and 
local governments.39 However, increased autonomy has led more 
provinces to compete for natural resources.40 Rather than consistently 
enforce national laws and regulations, provincial and local 
governments prioritize self-interest and local economic growth41 over 
national objectives.42  
A complex institutional framework of ministries and 
administrative departments with authority to administer 
environmental protection laws and regulations further complicates 
the enforcement of environmental law. Several factors aggravate 
 
 38. See Juan-Camilo Cárdenas & Elinor Ostrom, How Norms Help Reduce the Tragedy of 
the Commons: A Multi-Layer Framework for Analyzing Field Experiments, in NORMS AND THE 
LAW 105, 109–10 (John N. Drobak ed., 2006) (discussing how non-self regarding game 
strategy achieves the Pareto-optimal solution under norms that encourage universal 
cooperation).  
 39. Wang Yahua, supra note 30, at 95. 
 40. Indicative of the growing recognition of the tension implicit between China’s 
environment and its model of economic development, the 2006 State Council report on the 
environment stated that “[t]he conflict between environment and development is becoming ever 
more prominent.” STATE COUNCIL INFORMATION OFFICE, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN 
CHINA 1996–2005 (2006), http://English.peopledaily.com.cn/200606/05/eng20060605_271168. 
html.  
 41. Since China’s 2001 accession to the World Trade Organization, “local governments’ 
blind pursuit of quick and short-term economic gain without regard to environmental 
consequences” led foreign investors to relocate “heavy-polluting and resource-intensive 
industries” to China on a large scale. Yuhong Zhao, Trade and Environment: Challenges After 
China’s WTO Accession, 32 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 41, 47–49 (2007). In an effort to alleviate 
poverty, rural regions have emphasized economic development and offered incentives to 
encourage (heavily polluting) factories to relocate from cities to the countryside; accordingly, 
water quality in rural regions is worse than in urban areas. See Li Zhiping, Protection of 
Peasants’ Environmental Rights During Social Transition: Rural Regions in Guangdong 
Province, 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 337, 338 (2007); see also Shun Yong Yeh, supra note 12, at 423–
26 (discussing how officials pressured to maintain employment levels often accommodate local 
enterprises); Patti Goldman, Public Interest Environmental Litigation in China: Lessons 
Learned from the U.S. Experience, 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 251, 253 n.9 (2006–2007) (citing 
William P. Alford & Yuanyuan Shen, Limits of the Law in Addressing China’s Environmental 
Dilemma, 16 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 125, 142–43 (1997) (noting that the main source of revenue for 
local governments is industry)). 
 42. See U.S. EMBASSY BEIJING, CLEARING MUDDY WATERS: CHINA CENTRALIZING 
WATER MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY (2002), http://beijing.usembassy-china.org.cn/report0702 
water.html (discussing how in the past, provincial and municipal governments have disregarded 
water quality standards and ignored water allocation to promote economic development).  
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weak enforcement and implementation of laws in China, including: 
(1) local government protectionism;43 (2) barriers to public 
participation in law implementation; (3) high information costs;44 (4) 
scarcity of Chinese lawyers; and (5) overly complex legal texts.45 
Numerous unharmonized guidelines, standards, regulations, and laws 
also frustrate any coordinated environmental protection regime.46 In 
addition, bureaucracy obscures the collecting and reporting of 
consistent statistics on the environment, further complicating the 
development of effective environmental law in China.47 Changing 
cultural norms, localism, and complex and conflicting laws and 
regulations result in incomplete enforcement of environmental laws.  
D. Water Resource Management and Water Law in China 
Historically, Chinese water law has evolved in accordance with 
social and political norms.48 If adjudged by the elements of 
“exclusiveness, duration, divisibility, and transferability,” the quality 
of water rights increased between the Qin-Han dynasties (221 B.C. to 
220 A.D.) and the Ming-Qing dynasties (1368 to 1911).49 While the 
Qin-Han legal codes did not formally recognize water rights, during 
the Tang-Song period (618 to 1279), the introduction of water 
permits for irrigation purposes increased the exclusivity of water 
rights.50 Subsequently, the Ming-Qing dynasties further strengthened 
 
 43. Official government policies—including the system of performance assessment, 
which prioritizes economic growth as the primary standard by which to adjudge official 
performance—reflect the myopic emphasis on economic development above environmental 
protection. Wang, supra note 1, at 199. 
 44. Information is both difficult (costly) to access and non-transparent. See Ferris & 
Hongjun Zhang, supra note 19, at 596–97. For a discussion of information costs associated with 
monitoring and enforcing property rights in water use, see Henry E. Smith, Governing Water: 
The Semicommons of Fluid Property Rights, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 445 (2008). 
 45. Ferris & Hongjun Zhang, supra note 19, at 595–601.  
 46. As of January 15, 2004, there were 28 laws, 50 administrative regulations, 170 
ministerial rules, and 546 environmental standards, as well as 1,552 environmental rules and 
regulations promulgated by provincial and local-level governments. Shun Yong Yeh, supra 
note 12, at 426–27. 
 47. See generally id.  
 48. For a discussion of the interplay between cultural norms and the law, see generally 
NORMS AND THE LAW (John Drobak ed., 2006).  
 49. Kinne, supra note 8, at 9. 
 50. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol29/iss1/13
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009]  Avoiding the Problem of the Commons 359 
 
 
legal recognition of property dimensions to water rights, which were 
made both transferable and inheritable.51 However, with the 
Communist takeover in 1949, rights to water—along with rights to all 
other natural resources—became “state rights.”52  
In recent years, the increasing marketization of the economy has 
again transformed water rights. In 2002, the Water Law was amended 
to recognize the transfer of water resources,53 to increase local 
governments’ autonomy to regulate water resources on a regional 
level, and to structure water resource management along a system of 
river basin management.54 Recent response to major water shortages 
has centralized water resource management into seven River 
Commissions, which rank as bureaus under the Ministry of Water 
Resources (“MWR”).55 However, water policy in China is 
fragmented and uncoordinated: along with the River Commissions, 
SEPA,56 the Ministry of Construction, the Ministry of Agriculture, 
 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. The 2002 Law amended the 1988 Water Law, which defined a system of water 
management wherein “[t]he state shall, with respect to water resources, adopt a system which 
combines unified administration with administration at various levels and by various 
departments.” Zhongguo Shuifa yu [Water Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Jan. 21, 1988, effective July 1, 1988), art. 9, translated in LAWINFOCHINA (last 
visited Dec. 29, 2008) (P.R.C.). While river basin management has a lengthy history in China, 
not until the 2002 Water Law was river basin management intricately detailed with a system for 
efficient water allocation for economic development, sustainable water utilization for social use, 
and prevention and control of water disasters. River basin management of water resources 
originated as early as the Xia Dynasty (2200 BC), where the Great Emperor Yu harnessed 
rivers and united the state. In the 1930s, the central government in China instituted modern river 
basin management organizations, and in 1949, the Chinese state instituted the Yellow Water 
Resources Commission under the auspices of the Ministry of Water Resources. Dajun Shen, 
supra note 6, at 350. The 2002 Water Law sets up a water resource management system 
controlled by the State, split into “comprehensive plans” by watershed and by region. Zhongguo 
Shuifa yu [Water Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 29, 
2002, effective Oct. 1, 2002), art. 14, translated in LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Dec. 29, 2008) 
(P.R.C.) [hereinafter 2002 Water Law].  
 54. An impetus for amending the system of water resource management, between 1972 
and 1998, the Yellow River dried up during twenty-one years. Dajun Shen, supra note 6, at 
350; see also 2002 Water Law, supra note 53, art. 14. 
 55. The River Commissions manage China’s principal watersheds and coordinate water 
use between upstream and downstream users to improve management of scarce water resources. 
U.S. EMBASSY BEIJING, supra note 42.  
 56. The fact that SEPA is understaffed certainly contributes to its ineffectiveness. 
Compared to the United States Environmental Protection Agency, which has 9,000 staff 
members in its Washington, D.C., office alone, SEPA has only 300 employees in Beijing and 
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and the Ministry of Mines and Minerals also coordinate water 
management.57 
Building on the 1988 Water Law, the 2002 Law established a 
system of water use permits, in which water price was determined 
according to “compensation for cost, reasonable profits, quality, and 
equitable burden of price by all water users.”58 China’s Water Law 
was further amended in 2004 to reinforce allocation of water through 
a system of permits;59 however, the 2004 Water Law failed to give 
legal recognition to compensation earned from trading water 
permits,60 resulting in incompletely enforced water rights. A 2006 
regulation further supports the system of water use permits by 
requiring water users to apply for such permits and pay usage fees for 
water taken directly from rivers, lakes, or underground sources.61 
While the state maintains ownership of water resources under the 
Chinese Constitution,62 recently the state has begun to acknowledge 
lesser property interests in water resources.63  
 
only several hundred additional staff spread throughout the entire country. Economy, supra 
note 9, at 51.  
 57. SEPA regulates water quality; the Ministry of Construction monitors municipal water 
supply; the Ministry of Agriculture manages irrigation; and the Ministry of Mines and Minerals 
is responsible for groundwater supplies. U.S. EMBASSY BEIJING, supra note 42.  
 58. See 2002 Water Law, supra note 53, art. 7 & art. 55; Wouters et al., supra note 33, at 
282. 
 59. Kinne, supra note 8, at 10. 
 60. Although drafts of prior water laws—including the 2002 Water Law—indicate 
legislative support for water trading to promote water conservation, deletion of water trading 
provisions from the final laws implies reluctance to accept trading as a tool of water resource 
management. In deliberations for drafts of the 2002 amendment, paid water rights transfers 
were contemplated, but ultimately rejected as too controversial. Nonetheless, water trading has 
played a significant—if informal role in recent water disputes. Wang Yahua, supra note 30, at 
98. 
 61. See Regulation on the Administration of the License for Water Drawing and the Levy 
of Water Resource Fees (promulgated by the State Council, Feb. 21, 2006, effective Apr. 15, 
2006), art. 2, translated in LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Dec. 29, 2008) (P.R.C.); see also Zijun 
Li, China Issues New Regulation on Water Management, Sets Fees for Usage, WORLDWATCH 
INST., Mar. 14, 2006, http://www.worldwatch.org/node/3892.  
 62. XIAN FA art. 9, § 1 (1982), translated in LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Dec. 29, 2008) 
(P.R.C.). 
 63. Several notable water transfers and sales have improved the development of a water 
rights regime. In 2000, Dongyang City and Yiwu City negotiated an agreement for the annual 
transfer of fifty million cubic meters of water from Dongyang City’s Hengjin Reservoir to 
Yiwu City in exchange for US$24 million. Under the Dongyang-Yiwu agreement, Yiwu City 
pays for the water use right of a specified annual quantity of water at a stated water quality 
(Class I); although the water use rights are transferred, the ownership of the water does not 
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E. China’s Accession to the World Trade Organization and Official 
Commitment to the Rule of Law: The Significance of Property Rights 
in Improving Access to the Courts 
China’s decision to liberalize its economy and to integrate itself 
into the World Trade Organization64 (“WTO”) produced “a break 
with China’s long history of Confucian and Socialist traditions of 
subordinating law to the exercise of State power.”65 Concurrent with 
accession to the WTO in 2001, China made a commitment to 
improve citizens’ access to the courts, the transparency of the legal 
system, and the consistency of the application of the laws.66 China’s 
WTO commitment to provide adequate legal remedies to pollution 
victims is of particular significance to improving compliance with 
environmental law. 
Implicit in improving citizens’ access to the courts67 is the need to 
 
change. Bin Liu, Institutional Design Considerations for Water Rights Development in China, 
in WATER RIGHTS REFORM: LESSONS FOR INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 261, 267 (Bryan Randolph 
Bruns, Claudia Ringler & Ruth Meinzen-Dick eds., 2005). However, while the Dongyang-Yiwu 
water transfer is considered China’s first water use rights transfer, the absence of legal support 
for the transfer risks undermining its future stability. Additional transfers of water for 
compensation have occurred since the Dongyang-Yiwu agreement, among which the most 
interesting occur between private individuals and corporate actors. Between 2002 and 2003, the 
local government in the lower Zhanghe River provided US$90,000 to the local government in 
the upper regions of the river to transfer thirty million cubic meters of water from five 
reservoirs. Legal rights from the water distribution scheme were clearly delineated in 
documents supporting the sale, improving and defining the status of related water rights. Id. at 
265.  
 64. On December 11, 2001, China became a member of the World Trade Organization. 
World Trade Organization, Member Information: China and the WTO, http://www.wto.org/ 
English/thewto_e/countries_e/china_e.htm (last visited Dec. 29, 2008). 
 65. Wouters et al., supra note 33, at 247.  
 66. China’s accession to the WTO will hopefully encourage continued reform towards the 
“uniform, impartial, and reasonable” legal system mandated by the WTO. Eric W. Orts, The 
Rule of Law in China, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 43, 45 (2001) (citation omitted); see also 
Eric W. Orts, Environmental Law with Chinese Characteristics, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
545, 557 (2003). 
 67. While administrative license laws emphasize the importance of public contribution in 
conferring licenses, including water-withdrawal permits, effective public participation may only 
be achieved within holistic provisions, including those that provide access to the courts. See 
Xingzheng xuke fa [Administrative License Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Aug. 27, 2003, effective July 1, 2004), translated in LAWINFOCHINA (last 
visited Dec. 29, 2008) (P.R.C.); Wouters et al., supra note 33, at 307–08. Complete 
enforcement of environmental laws in China may only be achieved with greater public 
participation. See Christine J. Lee, “Pollute First, Control Later” No More: Combating 
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broaden and clarify the doctrine of standing to bring claims. 
Particularly when compared to the United States,68 standing to bring 
environmental litigation in China has been narrowly construed:69 to 
have standing to bring a claim, a petitioner must show injury to 
person or to property.70 Despite defining injury to property as 
grounds for standing, the General Principles of the Civil Law 
(“GPCL”) largely neglects to address different types of property 
rights.71 Notably, however, the GPCL does allude to several “quasi-
 
Environmental Degradation in China Through an Approach Based in Public Interest Litigation 
and Public Participation, 17 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 795, 809–22 (2008). 
 68. In the United States, standing to bring environmental litigation has been increasingly 
broadened. See Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 517–18 (2007) (finding that there is a 
sufficiently concrete interest affected in a state’s quasi-sovereign interest in “the earth and air 
within its domain,” to have standing to bring an environmental suit); see also Friends of the 
Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), 528 U.S. 167, 187–88 (2000) (holding that an 
environmental group had standing to bring a citizen suit against a holder of a pollution 
discharge permit). Aligning the environmental law enforcement regime in China with that in the 
United States discounts each country’s unique challenges, history, and culture; however, a 
comparison is worthwhile to reveal superior, as well as deficient, aspects of both systems. In the 
United States, enforcement of environmental laws relies on extensive agency support, as well as 
significant public participation. Among those reforms necessary to improve equal 
representation and equal access to justice in China’s environmental law regime, revising 
existing laws to support public participation through litigation and other means has taken 
central importance. Michael Eng & Ma Jun, Building Sustainable Solutions to Water Conflict in 
the United States and China, 8 CHINA ENV’T SERIES 155, 179 (2006).  
 69. While standing to bring environmental lawsuits has been difficult to obtain, Chinese 
law creates no-fault liability for plaintiffs who can prove that “(1) the defendant caused the 
pollution; and (2) the plaintiff suffered harm that is associated with that type of pollution.” 
Goldman, supra note 41, at 256–57; see also EPL, supra note 25, art. 41 (“[A] unit that has 
caused an environmental pollution hazard shall have the obligation to eliminate it and make 
compensation to the unit or individual that suffered direct losses.”). To avoid liability, a 
defendant may show that the pollution was caused by the plaintiff, a third party, an act of nature 
or another cause. Under the General Principles of the Civil Law, “[c]ivil liability shall not be 
borne for failure to perform a contract or damage to a third party if it is caused by force 
majeure, except as otherwise provided by law.” Ming fa tong ze [General Principles of the Civil 
Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Apr. 12, 1986, effective Jan. 1, 1987), art. 107, translated in LAWINFOCHINA (last 
visited Dec. 29, 2008) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter GPCL]. 
 70. “Citizens and legal persons who through their fault encroach upon state or collective 
property or the property or person of other people shall bear civil liability.” GPCL, supra note 
69, art. 106; see also id. art. 124. For further discussion of standing in Chinese Civil Procedure, 
see Goldman, supra note 41, at 256–57.  
 71. See Yin-Ching Chen, Civil Law Development: China and Taiwan, 2 STAN. J.E. ASIAN 
AFF. 8, 10 (2002) (concluding that China’s General Principles of Civil Law fails to elaborate on 
the types and contents of various forms of property ownership due to the deeply rooted socialist 
ideology of state ownership).  
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property rights,” including the right to use and obtain benefits from 
state-owned land and other natural resources.72 When compounded 
with China’s historic lack of legal recognition of private property and 
lesser ownership interests, standing has been difficult to obtain.73 
China’s diversified, explosive economic growth has revealed the 
deficiencies inherent in the inflexible, static civil law definition of 
property ownership as an indivisible whole. In contrast to common 
law systems, which describe ownership as a “bundle of sticks” from 
which lesser ownership interests may emerge, China’s civil law 
system conventionally perceived ownership as an indivisible, 
absolute whole.74 However, subsequent to China’s liberal market 
reforms in 1979, a decentralized economy started to “transfer” 
incidents of ownership to various economic agents. Proponents of 
changing China’s property rights regime argued a more precise yet 
flexible definition of property rights was needed to respond 
adequately to the changed social and economic conditions 
precipitated by the 1979 market reforms and to continue to encourage 
economic development.75  
To respond to the changing dynamics in China’s economy, the 
National People’s Congress promulgated the new Real Right Law on 
March 16, 2007,76 enlarging the scope of protected property interests 
and giving unprecedented recognition to private property 
ownership.77 As an indication of its significance, the Real Right Law 
 
 72. Id.  
 73. See generally Goldman, supra note 41. 
 74. In Chinese law, the conception of the totality of ownership arose from Soviet civil law 
jurisprudence, in which ownership was understood as an indivisible, absolute whole and jura in 
re aliena was not permitted. Frank Xianfeng Huang, The Path to Clarity: Development of 
Property Rights in China, 17 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 191, 207 (2004).  
 75. To give legal protection to the various property interests emerging from the liberalized 
Chinese economy, civil law scholars promoted recognition of decentralized, lesser “usufruct” 
rights (yongyi wuquan). Andrew C. Mertha, From “Rustless Screws” to “Nail Houses:” The 
Evolution of Property Rights in China 12 (2007) (unpublished article, available at 
http://artsci.wustl.edu/~amertha/pdf/Screws&Nails.pdf).  
 76. “An individual’s legal property shall be under the protection of law, no entity or 
individual may encroach, plunder or destroy” Wuquan fa [Real Right Law of the People’s 
Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 16, 2007, 
effective Oct. 1, 2007), art. 66, translated in LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Dec. 29, 2008) 
(P.R.C.) [hereinafter Real Right Law].  
 77. Completeness of property rights may be determined according to whether the rights 
are (1) “legally recognizable,” (2) “socially recognizable [in accordance with social norms],” or 
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was enacted by the National People’s Congress with the longest time 
from introduction to passage in Chinese history: after thirteen years 
and eight rounds of formal deliberation,78 the Law was enacted to 
give unprecedented legal recognition to various forms of property 
ownership. The new Real Right Law gives legal protection to private 
property ownership, in addition to lesser, usufructuary interests 
ensuing from the decentralization of the economy.79  
II. ANALYSIS  
Clear delineation and regular enforcement of water rights 
incentivizes efficient water use and encourages investment in 
improving water quality.80 Successful water resource management 
requires both security and flexibility,81 a balance achieved through 
the combination of administrative involvement in water allocation 
and market control of efficient water use. Worldwide,82 the transition 
from fragmented to integrated, systemic water management has 
 
(3) “enforceable by external authorities.” ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, COMPENSATION AND 
VALUATION IN RESETTLEMENT: CAMBODIA, PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, AND INDIA 30 
(2007), available at http://www.adb.org/Documents/Reports/Capacity-Building-Compensation-
Valuation/Compensation-Valuation.pdf (citing Rekha Mehra, Women, Land, and Sustainable 
Development 4 (Int’l Ctr. for Research on Women, Working Paper No. 1, 1995)).  
 78. Zhu Keliang & Li Ping, Rural Land Rights Under the PRC Property Law, CHINA L. & 
PRAC., Nov. 2007, at 23, 23. 
 79. Real Right Law, supra note 76, art. 39. 
 80. Development of “exclusive property rights which reward the owners provide[s] a 
direct incentive to improve efficiency and productivity.” DOUGLASS C. NORTH, STRUCTURE 
AND CHANGE IN ECONOMIC HISTORY 89 (1981). 
 81. M.L. Livingston, Designing Water Institutions: Market Failures and Institutional 
Response, 9 WATER RESOURCES MGMT. 203, 204 (1995).  
 82. In the twenty-first century global economy, water will become as scarce, as contested, 
and as valued a resource as oil was in the twentieth century. Shawn Tully, Water, Water 
Everywhere, FORTUNE MAGAZINE, May 15, 2000, at 342, 344. The United States National 
Intelligence Council, which reports to the Central Intelligence Agency, warns that by 2015, 
water will become the main resource-scarcity problem, and that the social instability created by 
water shortages “will increasingly affect the national security of the United States.” Elaine 
Sciolino, 2015 Outlook: Enough Food, Scarce Water, Porous Borders, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 
2000, at A6. In its Human Development Report 2006, the United Nations Development 
Program warned that intensifying competition for water is now one of the gravest threats to 
sustained human development worldwide. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, 
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2006: BEYOND SCARCITY: POWER, POVERTY, AND THE 
GLOBAL WATER CRISIS 41–48 (2006), available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/ 
hdr2006/.  
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fostered the development of new institutions83 and regulatory 
frameworks that emphasize resource demand management84 and 
public participation.85  
Water resource management endeavors to achieve economically 
efficient and equitable allocation of water resources for society as a 
whole,86 while considering equitable and political interests in the just 
distribution of water.87 Water policy in industrialized countries has 
 
 83. Political and economic organizations (institutions) entail “[1] the establishment of a 
set of constraints on behavior in the form of rules and regulations; [2] a set of procedures 
designed to detect deviations from and enforce compliance with the rules and regulations; and 
[3] the articulation of a set of moral and ethical behavioral norms to reduce enforcement costs.” 
NORTH, supra note 80, at 18.  
 84. Pursuant to the recognition that “[f]resh water is a finite and valuable resource,” the 
International Conference on Water and the Environment declared that “[w]ater has an economic 
value in all its competing uses and should be recognized as an economic good.” International 
Conference on Water and the Environment, Dublin, Ir., Jan. 26–31, 1992, The Dublin Statement 
on Water and Sustainable Development, Principles 1 & 4, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/PC/112, 
available at http://www.inpim.org/files/Documents/DublinStatmt.pdf. 
 85. Promulgated by the European Commission in 2000, Water Framework Directive 
establishes an organizational framework of mutual objectives and principles for water resource 
management in European countries. Council Directive 2000/60, 2000 O.J. (L 327) 1 (EC), 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/water/water-framework/index_en.html [hereinafter 
WFD]. The WFD concluded that “control of [water] quantity is an ancillary element in securing 
good water quality and therefore measures on quantity, serving the objective of ensuring good 
quality, should also be established.” Id. at 2. See also Y.S. CAO, THE WORLD BANK 
ANALYTICAL & ADVISORY ASSISTANCE (AAA) PROGRAM CHINA: ADDRESSING WATER 
SCARCITY, EVOLUTION OF INTEGRATED APPROACHES TO WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN 
EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 3 (Apr. 2006), available at http://siteresources.worldbank. 
org/INTEAPREGTOPENVIRONMENT/Resources/WRM_US_EU_experience_EN.pdf. 
 86. Drafting regulations ultimately involves opportunity cost analysis and considerations 
of how resources can be optimally managed. Economic analysis of integrated water 
management considers the social, economic, and other associated costs and benefits of water 
allocation. In The Problem of Social Cost, Coase concluded that “in devising social 
arrangements, we should have a regard for total effect.” R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social 
Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 44 (1960). For further discussion, see R.H. Coase, The Nature of the 
Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937) (arguing that firms result from allocations of authority where 
the costs of private transactions would otherwise be prohibitively high).  
 87. With the growing scarcity of potable fresh water resources, corporations are 
competing over the right to control and profit from limited water resources, while concurrently 
portraying their efforts to improve public access to water. In distributing water rights, equitable 
interests and “cultural and ethical issues are essential to be addressed when dealing with limited 
water resources. Imbalances between availability and demand, the degradation of groundwater 
and surface water quality [through pollution], inter-sector competition, [and] interregional and 
international disputes all center around the question of how to cope with scarce water 
resources.” Bobby Ramakant, Fight to Keep Water a Right Not a Commodity for Future Profit, 
CHINA DAILY, Mar. 22, 2007, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2007-03/22/content_ 
833658.htm (quoting Dr. Sandeep Pandey, recipient of the 2002 Ramon Magsaysay Award).  
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evolved parallel to these objectives.88 Water-poor areas, including the 
Western United States, allocate water use rights through the doctrine 
of appropriation, which considers historical water use in allocating 
water rights and allows for water permits to be bought and sold like 
other market commodities.89 In recognition of the importance of 
efficient water allocation, “[d]espite the fact that water is a public 
resource, water rights are private property, and can be bought and 
sold much like any other commodity”90 in water markets. Water 
trading improves the regulation of water distribution and the 
efficiency of water use.91  
 
 88. According to Western legal tradition, state ownership of natural resources has often 
been asserted to confirm that 
(1) . . . water rights are usufructuary rights rather than ownership of possessory 
rights[]; (2) access to water requires State permission in the form of a permit, license, 
or court decree; (3) access can be denied if the State determines that a higher or more 
efficient alternative use of water exists; and (4) reallocations are subject to State 
review. 
Wouters et al., supra note 33, at 280. In the United States, the federal government creates the 
general policies and regulations for water resource management, while states implement the 
federal directives. CAO, supra note 85, at 10. Under constitutional law, states hold the primary 
authority “to allocate water, apply water rights, trade water, ensure and protect water quality” 
within their jurisdiction. Id. at 12. Given the absence of federal water laws, state laws and codes 
determine allocation of water rights, which vary according to the geographic location of the 
water and whether the water in question is groundwater or surface water. Id. at 17. In the thirty-
one eastern states, surface water rights are riparian rights (determined by land ownership 
rights): any landowner whose real property physically touches a surface water source has a 
usufructuary right—but not a property right—to use the water. Id. Under a riparian system of 
water rights, the riparian right comes from ownership of the riparian land and is non-
transferable to other lands. Id. In contrast, in the nineteen western states, water rights are 
allocated through appropriation, which considers historic entitlements to use of surface water 
(“first in time, first in right”). Id. Unlike riparian rights, water rights acquired through 
appropriation may be sold and transferred through permits; however, appropriative rights 
subsist on continued use and without continued use of the water right, it may be lost. Id. at 17–
18; see also Douglas S. Kenney, Prior Appropriation and Water Rights Reform in the Western 
United States, in WATER RIGHTS REFORM: LESSONS FOR INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 167, 171 
(Bryan Randolph Bruns, Claudia Ringler & Ruth Meinzen-Dick eds., 2005). 
 89. Kenney, supra note 88, at 169, 172; see also CAO, supra note 85, at 17. 
 90. Kenney, supra note 88, at 172. To adequately consider third party interests in water 
regulation, institutions often integrate a “public interest” standard when evaluating and 
approving water transfers. Id. at 174–75. To prevent possible abuses associated with 
unrestricted trading, state governments reserve the right to intervene in the trading. CAO, supra 
note 85, at 19.  
 91. Equitable distribution of transferable water permits improves the efficiency of water 
resource allocation and ensures the security of water rights. Well-established, active trading 
markets achieve numerous objectives, including “[1] encourag[ing] the highest beneficial use of 
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Given China’s growing economy and rapidly rising per capita 
incomes, interests in water rights are unbundled, with many 
individuals, corporations, and organizations invested in efficient and 
sustainable water rights allocation.92 As a result, water resource 
allocation should consider balancing relations among interested 
people and organizations93 and limiting the opportunities for 
opportunism and free riding among differently situated actors.94 By 
giving legal recognition to the lesser, usufruct property interests in 
water, the 2007 Real Right Law acknowledges the diverse interests 
invested in sustainable water resource allocation.95  
Research on and discussion surrounding the establishment of 
water rights has emphasized that usufructuary rights include both the 
right to use and the right to derive profit from water resources.96 
While the 200297 and 2004 Water Laws addressed many concerns 
associated with water scarcity and irregular enforcement of national 
environmental laws and regulations, the Laws did not significantly 
clarify water rights. Without the legal recognition of clearly 
 
water; [2] provid[ing] a source of adequate water supplies to beneficial new and supplemental 
water users[;] and [3] . . . funding for improve[ed] water user facilities.” CAO, supra note 85, at 
18. 
 92. Property rights “define differing relationships among persons depending on the 
bundles of rights that people hold.” Schlager, supra note 37, at 29. See generally JOHN R. 
COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM (1957) (developing ideas of institutional 
economics through an analysis of collective action by the state and other institutions). 
According to Schlager and Ostrom, five types of distinct property rights may be bundled in 
various ways among owners: right to access; right to withdraw; right to manage; right to 
exclude; and right to transfer. See Edella Schlager & Elinor Ostrom, Property-Rights Regimes 
and Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis, 68 LAND ECON. 249, 249–52 (1992).  
 93. Oran Young, Institutional Interplay: The Environmental Consequences of Cross-Scale 
Interactions, in THE DRAMA OF THE COMMONS 263, 265–66 (E. Ostrom et al. eds., 2002) 
 94. ELINOR OSTROM, CRAFTING INSTITUTIONS FOR SELF-GOVERNING IRRIGATION 
SYSTEMS 52–55 (1992). 
 95. Real Right Law, supra note 76, art. 39. 
 96. Wang Rong, Conceptualizing the Development of Water Rights in China, 4 US-CHINA 
L. REV. 25, 29, 114–15 (2007).  
 97. Among other provisions, the 2002 Water Law recognized the concept of matching 
water demand with water supply (“demand management”) and the need to create pricing 
mechanisms in accordance with the theory of demand management. See 2002 Water Law, supra 
note 53, art. 8. “[T]he 2002 Water Law of the People’s Republic of China for the first time 
defines river basin management institutions and functions, the legal status of river basin 
management organizations in China, and strengthens the administrative rights of river basin 
management organizations.” Dajun Shen, supra note 6, at 345. See also U.S. EMBASSY BEIJING, 
supra note 42. 
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delineated water rights,98 there effectively can be no market for the 
economic and otherwise efficient trading of such rights.99 Although 
the draft of the 2002 amendment to the Water Law100 included 
provisions for the transfer of water rights, the controversial provision 
was ultimately deleted. Noted as one of the Water Law’s major 
deficiencies, failure to provide legal mechanisms for the transfer of 
water use permits discourages optimal resource allocation on the 
microeconomic level and removes important market mechanisms in 
the efficient pricing of water resources.101  
To improve the efficiency of water allocation within a market 
economy, water rights must be aligned with water market theory to 
achieve optimal distribution of water resources.102 Chinese policy-
makers and economists have widely recognized the growing 
importance of improving water quantity and quality to ensure China’s 
continued economic development.103 Under China’s current law, 
 
 98. Clearly established water rights ensure returns on private investment in sustainable 
water use, thereby encouraging vigilance over property (water usufruct rights) and “impact[ing] 
both the concepts of ‘quantity’ and ‘quality’” of water. Wang Rong, supra note 96, at 33. 
 99. U.S. EMBASSY BEIJING, supra note 42. 
 100. The 2002 Amendment Draft provided that “[a]ny unit or individual which has 
obtained the right to draw water, and has saved water . . . within the duration and quantity of the 
relevant permit, are entitled to transfer the saved water resources after the approval of the 
authorities which issue the relevant permit.” Wouters et al., supra note 33, at 306 (quoting 2002 
Water Law, supra note 53 (Amendment Draft art. 45.2)).  
 101. Bin Liu, supra note 63, at 264.  
 102. Bin Liu, China’s Agricultural Water Policy Reforms, in WORKSHOP ON 
AGRICULTURE AND WATER: SUSTAINABILITY, MARKETS, AND POLICIES (Org. for Econ. Co-
operation and Dev. (OECD) ed., 2005), available at http://www.oecd.org/document/16/ 
9,3343,en_21571361)34281952_35453968_1_1_1_1,00.html; see generally ORG. FOR ECON. 
CO-OPERATION AND DEV. (OECD), ENVIRONMENT, WATER RESOURCES AND AGRICULTURAL 
POLICIES: LESSONS FROM CHINA AND OECD COUNTRIES (2006) (outlining ways and means of 
better aligning water resource use with societal interests and environmental sustainability). 
 103. Wang Shu-cheng, To Construct Water Saving Society and to Secure the Sustainable 
Development of Economy and Society, 14 XINHUA WENZHAI 13–14 (2006); see also A Modest 
Proposal: China Should Liberalize Water Pricing, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 28, 2006, at 50. 
Credible systems of governance must adapt to social and economic change. According to 
Guttman and Yaqin, “governance tools are shaped by formal institutions—but are also shaped 
by powerful underlying forces of competition and cooperation rooted in human nature and 
culture.” Dan Guttman & Song Yaqin, Making Central-Local Relations Work: Comparing 
America and China Environmental Governance Systems, 1 FRONTIERS ENVTL. SCI. & 
ENGINEERING CHINA 1, 2 (2007). The Chinese government’s knowing allowance of recent 
transfers of water rights confirms the growing recognition of the importance of the 
transferability of water rights. See Kinne, supra note 8, at 6 (noting the implicit governmental 
support of recent inter-provincial water trading).  
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water resources are state-owned, and water users have been officially 
restricted from the right to derive earnings from their usery 
interests.104 However, as promoted by numerous scholars and as 
evidenced by noteworthy water trades and sales that the Chinese 
government has knowingly permitted,105 efficient allocation of water 
rights can only occur in a system that provides for water permit 
trading mechanisms.106 Effective market rules that guide the efficient 
allocation of well-designed, regularly-enforced water rights 
incentivize cooperation among water users and ensure investment in 
sustainable use of water resources.  
Enactment of the 2007 Real Right Law creates legal protection for 
water rights. While the new Real Right Law affirms the state’s 
ownership of water,107 the Law gives legal protection to usufruct 
ownership rights, arguably protecting the right to use and earn profits 
from selling usufruct rights to the water.108 Under the Law, water 
rights are legally protected usufruct rights in relation to national 
ownership of natural resources.109 As reinforced by the 2007 Real 
Right Law, water rights are usufruct rights (in relation to state 
ownership of natural resources) that can be considered property 
rights.110 Legal recognition of usufructuary interests protects the 
profits à prendre from sale of the usufruct rights,111 theoretically 
including the compensation earned through sale and trade of water 
permits. Balancing the private elements of water rights against the 
public interest components of water resource allocation ensures water 
rights are primarily private, while providing the government the right 
to intervene in improper transfers or uses that violate the public 
 
 104. Purely administrative control over water resources risks uneconomic resource 
allocation, resulting in a form of “government failure.” Bin Liu, supra note 63, at 263.  
 105. See supra note 63. 
 106. Wouters et al., supra note 33, at 306. 
 107. “Mineral deposits, waters and sea areas shall be owned by the state.” Real Right Law, 
supra note 76, art. 46.  
 108. Under Article 39, “[t]he owner of a realty or chattel has the rights to possess, use, seek 
profits from and dispose of the realty or chattel according to law.” Id. art. 39. 
 109. According to some, “the right to use water, as with all newly emerging property 
rights, [is] usufructuary so long as the State retains formal ownership.” Wouters et al., supra 
note 33, at 281.  
 110. Bin Liu, supra note 63, at 270. The private components of water rights entitle the right 
owner to transfer, inherit, and enforce the right. Bin Liu, supra note 63, at 270.  
 111. Frank Xianfeng Huang, supra note 74, at 207–08.  
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welfare.112 Localized water management diminishes the high 
monitoring costs associated with centralized planning113 and provides 
individual permit owners incentive to invest in sustainable use of 
their water rights.  
III. PROPOSAL 
Despite China’s numerous environmental laws and regulations, 
the lack of an effective enforcement regime has encouraged 
noncompliance with the law. Absent an effective administrative 
approach to enforcement of environmental law, individuals must be 
given a more significant, meaningful role in enforcing compliance 
with the law.114 Market-based reforms of water resource allocation 
will have an insignificant effect on improving water quality and 
quantity without broader provisions for public participation through 
litigation.115 Parallel with the expansion of China’s decentralized 
economy, the development of localized market-based allocation of 
water rights, along with improved mechanisms for public 
participation, will dramatically improve water quantity and quality.116  
Prior to the development of statutory standing, the basic legal 
protections inherent in property, contract, and other privately held 
rights form the foundation of “environmental law.” Absent statutory 
standing, property rights holders may assert claims under tort and 
nuisance law117 and seek judicial intervention in cases of interference 
 
 112. Bin Liu, supra note 63, at 270.  
 113. Localized water management concerns the allocation of water permits, regulation of 
use fees, and creation of water markets. CAO, supra note 85, at 17–28. 
 114. Without an effective centralized, administrative approach to water resource 
management, “private actors have the potential to advance the level of environmental 
protection, either by supplementing government action or in lieu of it.” Simon SC Tay, 
Southeast Asian Fires: The Challenge for International Environmental Law and Sustainable 
Development, 11 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 241, 243–44 (1999). 
 115. For a discussion of broadening standing to protect less directly affected legal interests 
and to permit citizen suits, see Goldman, supra note 41, at 260 (explaining that in the United 
States, “[s]hifting the focus of environmental litigation away from compensation for specific 
environmental injuries toward prevention required a broadening of the standing doctrine . . . [to] 
encompass[] individuals who were less directly and personally impacted by environmental 
harm.”). 
 116. Eng & Ma Jun, supra note 68, at 155.  
 117. Orts, supra note 66, at 560; see Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 871–72 
(N.Y. 1970) (granting relief where landowners alleged a nuisance claim because the polluting 
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with their property.118 Particularly in a developing legal system, 
enforcement of private property rights is fundamental to 
environmental regulation.119 Increasing in popularity among Chinese 
lawmakers, attributing rights to water permit holders has been offered 
as a means, not only of improving the efficiency of water 
distribution, but also of ensuring the quality of water resources.120 
Improving the enforcement of environmental laws and regulations 
requires providing legal protection to protect investments in efficient, 
environmentally sustainable property use. In the absence of a 
property rights regime to protect usufructuary interests,121 
environmental plaintiffs have not been able to obtain standing when 
their asserted injury concerns interference with their property interest 
in the water itself.122 Promoting a more effective system of water 
rights requires participation by interested individuals and 
organizations.123 Above all, however, to be effective, water rights 
trade must provide water rights holders recourse mechanisms to 
ensure the accountability of violators of the owners’ right to use and 
enjoy their property.124  
 
operations of a neighboring cement plant created substantial injury to their property).  
 118. Orts, supra note 66, at 558.  
 119. As evidenced in the 2001 desertification law, which grants property rights to citizens 
who contribute to land improvement and conservation, recent laws have begun to recognize the 
efficiency and effectiveness of a private rights-based system of environmental protection. U.S. 
EMBASSY BEIJING, CHINA ADOPTS LAW TO CONTROL DESERTIFICATION (2001), 
http://Beijing.usembassy-china.org.cn/report1101desert.html. The grant of property rights to 
water (through water permits) will likely improve the private rights approach to environmental 
law enforcement.  
 120. Wang Rong, supra note 96, at 33–34. 
 121. For water property rights to be adequately enforced, water rights holders must not 
only have clearly delineated legal rights in relation to their property, but they must also have 
access to the courts to effectively enforce their usufruct rights. 
 122. In the absence of a flexible property rights regime, standing has been narrowly 
construed to involve injury to person or property and has failed to protect lesser, usufructuary 
interests. For example, in cases brought by China’s Center for Legal Assistance to Pollution 
Victims on behalf of pollution victims, standing has been obtained by showing loss of duck 
eggs due to wastewater pollution and by loss of fish due to industrial pollution. Goldman, supra 
note 41, at 257.  
 123. The water ticket trade between the farmers of Shiyang He River Basin and the Heihe 
River Basin exemplifies a notable transfer of temporary water rights between interested 
individuals (as opposed to the long-term rights transferred in the governmental exchanges). 
Wang Rong, supra note 96, at 33. 
 124. Bin Liu, supra note 63, at 274. Although allocation of water rights to individual 
farmers would not be economical, agricultural water rights could be issued to water users’ 
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Judicial enforcement of privately held rights has a significant role 
in environmental regulation. Developing a system of property 
interests in water (water rights) arguably improves water right 
holders’ access to courts under the Chinese doctrine of standing. To 
establish a claim for injury to or interference with an interest in the 
use and enjoyment of property, the claimant must first show a 
legitimate property interest is at stake.125 The 2007 Real Right Law’s 
recognition of privately held property rights—including water permit 
holders’ usufructuary interests in state-owned water resources—
allows water permit holders to bring nuisance claims in cases of 
interference with their water rights.126 The prominence and implicit 
government approval of recent transfers and sales of water further 
increases water permit holders’ property interests in their bundle of 
rights.  
Legal recognition and protection of usufruct rights in water 
achieves the dual pronged goals of economically efficient and 
environmentally sustainable water use. Uniform implementation of a 
market-based system of water licenses and pollutant discharge 
permits will not only increase efficient allocation and use of water 
resources, ensure continued economic development, and prevent 
water conflicts, but will also assure a legally protected property 
 
associations, permitting class action suits in cases where pollution interferes with the water 
users’ association’s right to water use or enjoyment. Telephone Interview with A. Dan Tarlock, 
Distinguished Professor of Law & Dir. of the Program in Envtl. & Energy Law, Chicago-Kent 
Coll. of Law, in Chicago, Ill. (Oct. 25, 2007); see also Bin Liu, supra note 63, at 272. For 
further discussion of the role of water users’ associations in water rights reform, see James E. 
Nickum, Uphill Flow of Reform in China’s Irrigation Districts, in WATER INSTITUTIONS: 
POLICIES, PERFORMANCE, AND PROSPECTS 81, 90–91 (Chennat Gopalakrishnan, Cecilia 
Tortajada & Asit K. Biswas eds., 2005). 
 125. For further discussion of the use of the private nuisance doctrine in water pollution 
cases in the United States, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 821D–821E (1979). 
Despite the United States’ enactment of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water 
Act), courts were initially reluctant to permit a nascent statutory scheme to replace the common 
law doctrine of nuisance as applied to water pollution claims. Ken Alex, A Period of 
Consequences: Global Warming as Public Nuisance, 43A STAN. J. INT’L L. 77, 87 (2007). In 
Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 102–03, 106–07 (1972), the Court concluded that the federal 
statutory regime was insufficient to displace the federal common law nuisance claim as applied 
to interstate water pollution and permitted Illinois to proceed with its claim. Alex, supra at 87.  
 126. Real Right Law, supra note 76, art. 37. 
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interest in water, securing private citizens’ standing in environmental 
litigation.127  
CONCLUSION 
Pursuant to a policy of “pollute first, control later,” China’s 
extraordinary economic development has resulted in equally 
unprecedented environmental decline.128 In addition to the 
tremendous burden on human and ecological health, environmental 
pollution has arguably negated recent economic growth and threatens 
continued market development.129 Degraded water quality and 
inadequate water supplies endanger not only China’s—but also the 
world’s—domestic social and environmental stability.130 Encouraging 
the continued development of water rights will improve optimal 
water consumption and encourage efficient, environmentally 
sustainable use of water essential to China’s continued economic 
growth and social development.  
The 2007 Real Right Law gives unprecedented legal recognition 
to alternate forms of ownership—including private property 
ownership and usufructuary interests.131 Legal recognition and 
protection of the property interests in water provide water permit 
holders an incentive to invest in sustainable water use and to enforce 
their legal rights to the amount of water stipulated in and protected by 
the water permit.  
Clear delineation of water rights will improve water conservation 
and encourage investment in sustainable water use. In addition, legal 
recognition of the water permit holders’ usufructuary rights in water 
arguably gives standing to the environmental pollution victims. 
Uniform implementation of a market-based system of water rights 
will not only increase efficient allocation and use of water resources, 
 
 127. In parts of the United States, active water-trading markets help ensure efficient 
allocation of water resources, and when on a large-scale, water trading contributes to economic 
development. To diminish the impact of unrestricted water trading on water use, state 
governments maintain the right to intervene in water trading. CAO, supra note 85, at 18–19. 
 128. THE WORLD BANK, supra note 5, at 23. 
 129. Id. 
 130. See Vidal, supra note 5; see also Yingeling Liu, supra note 16; Economy, supra note 
9, at 48. 
 131. Real Right Law, supra note 76, art. 2. 
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ensure continued economic development, and prevent water conflicts, 
but legal protection of water permit holders’ property rights will 
secure private citizens’ access to the courts, improving the 
enforcement of environmental laws and regulations through 
litigation. 
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